


1 June 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Current Intelligence
SUBJECT : Mao Memo

1. In substance, I agree that it doesn't make any sense to try to discuss the mechanics of succession. I'm a little worried, however, at the bland tone, relatively speaking. Obviously this is a major event. The consequences may be traumatic. In other words, I think there ought to be a little "worst case" discussion: civil war, rapprochement with the Soviets, temptations for Soviet intervention. As it is, the memo suggests to the reader that he has little more to worry about in the short run than the immobilism that has persisted since 1966.

2. As to coordination, I think it is more important to get on the streets quickly with a sensible, if speculative, paper than it is to achieve coordination on speculation which may not be coordinatable in the first place. Do that, and at the same time promise a longer coordinated look in a week or so, after the first moves in the game are played. It might also be possible, if only experimentally, to attempt coordination of a memo now on a contingency basis. The other agencies would have to understand that in the event we would use those portions of the contingency memo that were still valid, but would have to be free to strike out on our own as well.



RICHARD LEHMAN

25X1

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(47)